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AN ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
THE HOME MORTGAGE DISCLOSURE
ACT OF 1975
The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act was intended toprovide information concern-
ing 'redlining. " Through interviews and questionnaires the authors investigated
the efficacy f the Act in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, which contains Cleveland and
its adjacent suburbs. The authors conclude that local housing organizations and
financial institutionsfind the disclosure information use/ul they suggest that the
Act be renewed and amended to require disclosure of information indicating de-
mand for mortgage loans and to provide for centralized data collection and
processing.
URBAN DISINVESTMENT is a topic of great, current concern
in the United States. Many authors have written recently on
residential lending processes,' "redlining,"2 and the Home Mort-
gage Disclosure Act of 1975 (HMDA),3 as they affect disinvest-
ment, primarily in our urban centers. Nevertheless, the existence
of redlining has rarely been proved, due to the scarcity of data on
the lending practices of financial institutions. Because of the
mystery surrounding redlining-some claiming that it is a vital
contributor to the difficulties of our cities, and others denying its
existence or relevance--Congress passed the HMDA so that, "by
providing facts, [it could] bring to an end more than a decade of
'red-lining' charges and countercharges." 4
The purpose of this Note is to analyze the effectiveness of the
1. See, e.g., U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, MORTGAGE MONEY: WHO GETS
IT? A CASE STUDY IN MORTGAGE LENDING DISCRIMINATION IN HARTFORD, CONNECTI-
cuT (1974); Earthman, Residential Mortgage Lending: Charting a Course Through the Regu-
latory Maze, 29 VAND. L. REV. 957 (1976).
2. See, e.g., Duncan, Hood, & Neet, Redlining Practices, Racial Resegregation, and
Urban Decay Neighborhood Housing Services as a Viable Alternative, 7 URB. LAW. 5 10
(1975); Renne, Eliminating Redlining by JudicialAction: Are Erasers Available, 29 VAND.
L. REV. 987 (1976); Note, Attacking the Urban Redlining Problem, 56 B.U. L. REv. 989
(1976); Note, Urban Housing Finance and the Redlining Controversy, 25 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
110 (1976). For a wide spectrum of views about redlining, see Hearings on S 1281 Before
the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings]. These sources generally define redlining as the denial by
financial institutions of mortgage loans in particular geographic areas, without regard to
the borrower's creditworthiness or the property's condition.
3. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2809 (1976); see, e.g., Comment, Red-lining and the Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975: A Decisive Step Toward Private Urban Redevelopment, 25
EMORY L.J. 667 (1976).
4. H.R. REP. No. 561, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2303, 2306.
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HMDA in meeting its stated purposes,5 as they relate to redlining
and the residential lending process. The following analysis is
based not only on information digested from literature on the sub-
ject, but also on information gathered from interviews, conducted
during the first eight months of 1977, with representatives of local
community and housing organizations, officers of federally regu-
lated financial institutions, and a sample of residents of the area.
6
All interviews reported in this Note were conducted in Cuyahoga
County, Ohio, which contains Cleveland and its adjacent suburbs.
Twenty-nine of the thirty-eight financial institutions in Cuyahoga
County which reported for the HMDA agreed to permit inter-
views with a representative of their institution-generally either
the chief executive officer or an officer with primary responsibility
for residential mortgages.7 Eight of the institutions surveyed were
commercial banks and twenty-one were savings and loan associa-
tions.8  In addition, fifteen nongofernmental organizations that
5. These stated purposes are:
to provide the citizens and public officials of the United States with sufficient
information to enable them to determine whether depository institutions are fill-
ing their obligations to serve the housing needs of the communities and neighbor-
hoods in which they are located and to assist public officials in their
determination of the distribution of public sector investments in a manner
designed to improve the private investment environment.
12 U.S.C. § 2801(b) (1976).
6. These interviews were conducted as part of research project number 77-10655,
funded by the Law and Social Sciences Program, Division of Social Sciences, National
Science Foundation, Washington, D.C. The conclusions of the researchers do not neces-
sarily reflect the opinions of the National Science Foundation.
7. Interviews were conducted with assurances of confidentiality; therefore, no hous-
ing organization or financial institution is specifically mentioned without its prior ap-
proval. Data collected during the research project is compiled in a file available upon
request at the library of the Case Western Reserve University School of Law. The inter-
views were based on a combination of both open-ended and closed questions which were
pretested with individuals not included in the study.
8. Eight financial institutions identified as active in Cuyahoga County were not in-
terviewed. One of these, a savings and loan association, had recently completed a merger
with another association which was interviewed. One major commercial bank, which was
at that time the subject of much controversy over a tax abatement granted by the City of
Cleveland, refused to be interviewed about bank policy. One of its assistant vice-presi-
dents explained to the interviewers that it was bad publicity to talk about disclosure of the
institution's lending policies. In contrast, a second small commercial bank declined to be
interviewed because it had not made any home mortgages in ten years and had no strong
feelings about the HMDA.
One savings and loan, the largest home mortgage lender among savings and loans in
the county, refused to be interviewed on the ground that the National Savings and Loan
League had presented their view in its report on the HMDA. One of the smaller savings
and loans was -not interviewed because its president was fed up with government
paperwork. He had testified before Congress about the HMDA and felt there was no
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work in the area of redlining and know about the HMDA were
identified.' Officials of each of these organizations were inter-
viewed. Finally, eight hundred county residents were asked
about their knowledge and use of the HMDA and about their re-
lationship to housing organizations. This multistage cluster sam-
ple was representative of 1970 census data on race, sex, and age.' °
The interviews were conducted to learn whether the Act has been
utilized as Congress anticipated, whether it has fulfilled its pur-
poses, and what legislative and other systemic changes are recom-
mended to meet the problems associated with redlining.
Preceding the analysis of the Act itself, the first section of the
Note provides an overview of the residential lending process, fol-
lowed by a discussion of redlining. The next section describes the
HMDA, its purposes and its substantive provisions, and analyzes
how it is being used in Cuyahoga County. The Note concludes
by considering the recommended changes in the Act and in the
present system of residential mortgage lending.
I. BACKGROUND: RESIDENTIAL LENDING
Providing a "decent home and a suitable living environ-
ment "" for all has been federal policy since the Housing Act of
demand for the disclosure information. Three of the smallest savings and loans were not
interviewed because each repeatedly postponed the scheduled times.
9. These organizations included countywide organizations as well as neighborhood-
based groups which primarily derive their support from and center their activities in partic-
ular circumscribed areas of the county. Of the eleven with limited geographic foci, two
were based in individual, inner ring suburbs of Cleveland, while the remaining nine were
active in specific sections of Cleveland. More than half of the organizations ranked housing
as their first organizational concern, with the types of housing concerns varying considera-
bly. About one-third of the 15 groups focused on planning, research, and monitoring vari-
ous aspects of the home delivery system. These groups, which tended to have a county-
wide orientation, also provided assistance to traditional neighborhood-based organizations.
The latter were primarily concerned with the immediate problem of physical deterioration
of the neighborhood housing stock. Their activities generally included programs for re-
pairs, financing, and preventing abandonment.
Forty percent of the groups interviewed rely to some extent on foundation grants for
their financial support. One-third receive support from church organizations. Other
sources of income for these housing groups include fundraising drives, individual contribu-
tions, fees for services, contracts with local governments, and funding from government
agencies. The median total budget for these community groups was $70,000 per year.
10. Staruch, Sampling and Sample Characteristics-Cleveland Area Survey: 1976 and
1977 (1977) (unpublished: available at Cleveland Area Survey, Department of Sociology,
Case Western Reserve University).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970).
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1949.12 In the Fair Housing Act of 1968'1 Congress enacted a law
"to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing
throughout the United States."' 4 One popular way for individu-
als to acquire housing is by purchasing homes. 5 Because the cost
of buying a home is more than the vast majority of Americans can
afford to pay outright, the process of financing a home purchase is
a vital step toward owning a home. By controlling the process of
financing, a small number of persons and institutions greatly in-
fluence where, and on what terms, an individual eventually buys a
home. The means of control are often so subtle that home buyers
may not even be aware that the choice of where they will live is
being determined directly and indirectly on the basis of factors
other than their expressed needs and preferences and the com-
promises necessitated by the limits of their financial ability. Nev-
ertheless, when these decisions consistently distinguish between
groups of people on the basis of racial, cultural, or other
noneconomic criteria, the impact on selected geographic areas that
are thereby excluded from residential lending, except on noncom-
petitive terms, can be crippling. The effect on individuals about
whom these biased assumptions are made can be exclusionary.
The consistent refusal of lenders to provide residential mortgages
in specific areas is commonly known as redlining. 16 An overview
of the process of procuring a home is essential background for
analysis of the claims and counterclaims concerning redlining and
for evaluating the effectiveness of the HMDA.
A. Overview of the Home Buying Process
The ultimate goal of the home buying process is the purchase
of a house that meets the needs of the potential buyer, within the
constraints of what the buyer can afford to pay. At several criti-
cal points in the process the decisions of people other than the
buyer greatly influence where the individual will ultimately buy.
The seller decides whether to list with a real estate broker, which
broker to deal with, and on what terms. The broker decides
12. Id The policy was expressly reaffirmed in the Housing and Urban Development
Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 1441a (1970) (amended 1974).
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
14. Id § 3601.
15. "Almost two-thirds of all American families own their own homes." LendingDis-
criminatibn? Look at the Facts, 97 SAVINGS & LOAN NEWS 60 (Aug. 1976).
16. For a more detailed definition ofredlining, see notes 67-72 infra and accompany-
ing text.
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which houses to show a particular buyer and perhaps recommends
a lending institution to provide financing. An appraiser deter-
mines the value of the house, depending on various structural and
neighborhood characteristics. A loan officer decides whether or
not to lend, and on what terms to lend, based in part on his per-
ceptions of the applicant-buyer's financial capacity and on the ap-
praisal. The loan committee and officers of the financial
institution set the policies on lending and review the loan officer's
lending recommendations.
If the plans of a prospective buyer are frustrated by any of
these decisions, the individual may be forced to find alternate
sources of funds or alternate places to live. Since the actions of
those involved in the home buying process can seriously impede
attempts to find a suitable home and can result in loss of invest-
ment in entire neighborhoods, it is important to identify and ex-
amine the bases upon which all individuals in the chain make
decisions. Of particular importance is the degree of discretion and
objectivity involved at each step in the process, and the impact
that each decision can have when it concurs with other decisions
in the process. As decisions build on other decisions, the impact
on the applicant-buyer and on various neighborhoods may be am-
plified, particularly if each decision tends to reinforce the other
decisions in the process. These individual private decisions trig-
ger public concern when they become more or less consistent re-
sponses that have predictably disparate effects on identifiable
groups of individuals and communities.
The following description of the normative process of home
biaying, with particular emphasis on the financing mechanism,
will illustrate the impact that individual decisions can have on a
community. The emphasis on individual decisionmaking is im-
portant because it indicates how individuals who comprise part of
a larger process may make decisions that result in institutional
discrimination without any individual actually intending to cause
the end result. The process described is one of the most common
ways of buying a house. Obviously, other processes affect the to-
tal result in an area and on individuals. Moreover, the descrip-
tion is incomplete because information available under the
HMDA only covered the regulated financial institutions; informa-
tion on unregulated sources of funds, such as individuals or mort-
gage bankers, is not readily obtainable. Nevertheless, this
description accurately characterizes the majority of residential
1078 [Vol. 28:1074
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lending transactions which comprise an important class of trans-
actions greatly affecting home buying and financing in this coun-
try. Nonconventional sources of home financing become
important only when conventional credit is unavailable. Since
nonconventional sources provide funds at higher costs than con-
ventional sources, when the conventional lending process results
in a disproportionate impact on particular areas, the effects of the
private decisions within that process assume public importance.
B. Home Financing Alternatives
1. Prefinancing Decisions
The seller makes several decisions that affect the potential
buyer and the neighborhood where the marketed house is located.
The most important of these decisions are whether to engage a
real estate broker and at what price to sell the property. If the
seller contracts with a broker, the broker will show the property to
some potential buyers, but not to others. As one commentator
has noted: "The real estate broker has traditionally performed a
'gatekeeping' function, directing white buyers to predominantly
white areas and minority buyers to minority or interracial ar-
eas."'17  In addition, a decision whether or not to sell through a
real estate broker will affect whether or not the ultimate transac-
tion (or refusal to agree to a transaction) will be open to scrutiny
under the Fair Housing Act of 1968.18 The practice of racial
steering probably violates this Act, as does steering on the basis of
sex, religion, or ethnicity;19 nevertheless, there is little question
that race continues to be a consideration in many real estate prac-
tices.20
The seller will also decide at what price to list and to sell the
property. This price will, of course, limit the class of potential
buyers to those who can afford to buy the house. Potential buy-
ers who would otherwise be capable of buying a house in the com-
17. Note, Racial Steering: The Real Estate Broker and Title VIII, 85 YALE L.J. 808,
809 (1976). See also Brown, Access to Housing: The Role ofthe Real Estate Industry, 48
ECON. GEOGRAPHY 66 (1972).
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). This Act is also referred to as
Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968.
19. See Note, supra note 17. The author argues that Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), forbids real estate brokers from
providing different treatment to customers on the basis of race and thus prohibits virtually
all racial steering practices.
20. See, e.g., Holden, Euclid Park Area Invasion Target?, The Sunday Plain Dealer
(Cleveland), Feb. 19, 1978, § 1, at 1, col. 5.
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munity may be prevented from doing so if the seller sets a price
that is higher than that for which comparable houses have been
sold in the area. An extra-large down payment would be neces-
sary to cover the amount by which the sale price exceeds the ap-
praised value of the property.2' The appraised value of a house,
in turn, is greatly influenced by the selling prices of comparable
houses in the neighborhood.22
The buyer must provide the seller with the monetary consider-
ation before a house can be sold. Since most buyers do not have
the money immediately available, they must arrange for fimanc-
ing. The successful buyer must survive a series of screening deci-
sions23 before acquiring the financing from one of a variety of
financial institutions.24 The following sections describe the alter-
native sources of borrowed capital and the implications of the var-
ious alternatives for both the individual borrower and the area
surrounding the house being sold.
2. Lending Institutions
Savings and loan associations, mutual savings banks, and
commercial banks are probably the primary sources of home fi-
21
nancing. In 1967, savings and loan associations were investing
90.3% of their savings capital in home mortgages, mutual savings
banks had 67.5% of their total deposits invested in housing mort-
gages, and commercial banks had invested 20.6% of their total
21. Lenders lend no more than a certain percentage of the appraised value of the
property, and no more than another higher percentage without additional security, such as
FHA or private mortgage insurance. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 559.
22. See text accompanying notes 57 & 58 infra. Similarly, the price at which the seller
eventually sells may ultimately affect the value of other houses in the neighborhood
through the same appraisal process.
23. See notes 42-66 infra and accompanying text.
24. See notes 26-33 infra and accompanying text. The mortgage may be conven-
tional or government insured. See notes 34-41 infra and accompanying text.
25. While the emphasis throughout this Note is on financing the purchase of a home,
financing home repairs is another important aspect of the redlining issue. The process of
obtaining a second mortgage loan for repairs or home improvements is similar to that
described below.
26. For the purposes of this discussion, the differences between the various banks and
savings institutions are not particularly important. Their common characteristic is that
they are "depository institutions" to which the HMDA reporting requirements apply, 12
U.S.C. § 2802(2) (1976); that is, they invest deposits from customers, in addition to making
loans. 12 C.F.R. § 203.2(c) (1977). On the other hand, mortgage bankers, which are in
the business ofjust making loans, do not get their loan capital from deposits. Because they
are not federally regulated, information is not available to determine accurately the role of
mortgage bankers in the home mortgage market.
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time deposits in housing mortgages.' These figures indicate the
importance of home mortgages in the financial structure of the
various institutions.
The institutions, in turn, are vital to the home buying market.
In actual numbers of mortgages held in 1972, savings and loan
associations had by far the greatest (188,884,000), as compared to
commercial banks (90,114,000), and mutual savings banks
(64,333,000).28 At the end of 1973, savings and loan associations
held 48.4% of all loans on one to four family houses held by the
private sector in the United States.29
It is apparent from this information that savings and loan as-
sociations are the most important source of residential mortgage
money. Federal savings and loan associations were created by
the Home Owners' Loan Act of 193330 "to provide local thrift in-
stitutions in which people may invest their funds and. . . to pro-
vide for the financing of homes. . . .,,' Interviews in Cuyahoga
County indicate that savings and loan associations continue to see
themselves as savings institutions and residential mortgage lend-
ing institutions. The majority of savings and loan association
representatives interviewed indicated that developing savings de-
posits was more important than mortgage lending for their institu-
tion. Others indicated that developing savings deposits and
providing residential mortgages were given equal weight, while
still others said that residential lending was their most important
activity.32
3. Conventional and Government-Insured Mortgages
Home mortgages are typically purchase money mortgages
where the lender secures the debt by making the property
purchased the collateral for the loan. The lender provides a per-
27. Renne, supra note 2, at 993 nn.29-31.
28. Id
29. Note, Redlining-The Fight Against Discrimination in Mortgage Lending, 6 Loy.
CHi I.J. 71 n.2 (1975).
30. 12 U.S.C. § 1461 (1976).
31. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1976).
32. In contrast, when the commercial banks interviewed were asked the same ques-
tion: "Please rank, from most important to least important, your institution's activities,"
none considered residential mortgage lending to be one of their most important activities.
Commercial loans and consumer installment loans were their primary activities. L. Mc-
Kinney & P. Pap, Financial Institutions Interview Form at 3, No. 14 (1977) (unpublished
questionnaire on file in Case Western Reserve University School of Law Library) [herein-
after cited as Financial Interview].
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centage of the appraised value of the property, and the borrower
pays the remainder of the sale price to the bank in the form of a
downpayment. The percentage of the sale price of the house that
a financial institution will lend is based on what the institution
believes it can recover if it should have to foreclose and sell the
house; it must recoup from the sale the administrative and legal
costs involved as well as the amount of money lent. Lending in-
stitutions regulated by the federal government provide conven-
tional mortgages.33 Nonconventional mortgages can take a
variety of forms.34 They are resorted to by buyers who want to
buy a particular house in a particular area and have not found
conventional financing. The cost of nonconventional borrowing
is higher and has more onerous terms than conventional financ-
ing.35
Even financing by the Federal Housing Administration
(FHA), a common, nonconventional mortgage source, may be
more costly than conventional financing, despite its avowed statu-
tory purpose to make home ownership available to many people
who would otherwise be unable to afford it.36 The FHA has es-
tablished less stringent underwriting requirements for applicants
than those generally used by lending institutions.37 In addition,
lower interest rates and minimal downpayments offer more liberal
terms for borrowing. Loans insured by the FHA provide lenders
with the opportunity to make loans that are risk-free to the institu-
tion. If the borrower defaults, the lender recovers the entire un-
paid principal and interest as well as foreclosure costs.
38
Unfortunately, abuse in the administration of the FHA pro-
gram39 has made FHA lending a threat to neighborhoods attempt-
ing to avoid deterioration. Speculators can use FHA property to
recover a profit, foreclose quickly, and accelerate the deterioration
of properties.' One-third of the financial institutions inter-
33. These mortgages must be reported under the HMDA. 12 C.F.R. § 203.2(d) pro-
vides the definition of federally related mortgage loans that must be reported.
34. For a discussion of nonconventional mortgage loans, see Note, Attacking the Ur-
ban Redlining Problem, 56 B.U. L. Rav. 989, 999-1005 (1976).
35. Hearings, supra note 2, at 558-61 (research paper by Sternlieb, Burchell, & Lis-
tokin).
36. Note, supra note 34, at 1002.
37. Note, supra note 34, at 1001; see 24 C.F.R. § 203.43a (1977).
38. Note, Exploiting the Home-Buying Poor: A Case Study o/Abuse of the National
HousingAct, 17 ST. Louis L.J. 525, 543 (1973).
39. See Note, supra note 34, at 1003-05.
40. Lenders make a profit by charging borrowers "points" in addition to regular FHA
costs. See note 71 infra. Foreclosure occurs quickly because the lender can recover the full
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viewed which make FHA loans indicated that they or others cur-
rently used government insured, as opposed to conventional,
mortgages, when uneasy about granting loans in a particular area
felt to be risky or going downhill.4 ' Such selectivity in lending
may contribute to the problems associated with redlining and dis-
investment.
C. Institutional Lending Decisions-Practice, Policy, and
Impact4
2
1. The Real Estate Broker
As indicated above, potential buyers often find the houses they
want to buy through real estate brokers, who direct them to homes
that, in the view of the brokers, are suitable for the buyers and in
the best interests of the sellers, the brokers' clients. Brokers also
play an important role in determining the financial institution that
will provide the necessary funding and the terms of that funding.
They are the first level in the three-stage process of financial
screening that the typical buyer must undergo to acquire conven-
tional financing from a governmentally regulated lending institu-
tion.4 3
Savings and loan associations in Cuyahoga County indicated
that they receive a substantial majority of their home mortgage
applicants by referral from real estate agents.44 In fact, the most
amount insured and its expenses from the government, and because there is no incentive to
forbear from foreclosure as soon as the buyer has defaulted in mortgage payments. The
buyer is then evicted, pending foreclosure, leaving the property vacant and a vulnerable
target for vandals.
41. The question asked was: "Would you please react to the following sentence?
When a financial institution is unsure about granting mortgage loans in a particular area, it
would most likely grant only government-insured loans because such loans are risk-free."
Financial Interview, supra note 32, at 3, No. 13.
42. Because of the dominance of savings and loan associations in the residential
lending market, the decisional processes described below are most typical of savings and
loan associations, although the processes discussed are not materially different in other
contexts.
43. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, MORTGAGE MONEY: WHO GETS IT?. A CASE
STUDY IN MORTGAGE LENDING DISCRIMINATION IN HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT 9 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as HARTFORD REPORT]. This report includes data from staff interviews,
conducted in 1972 and 1973, of "real estate brokers, lenders, home buyers, public interest
groups, and Federal and city housing specialists." Id at n.9. It includes interviews of 10%
of the real estate firms in Hartford, including 80% of the black-owned firms. Id at n. 11.
The report also refers to many other statistical and analytical sources from which it draws
its composite picture of lending in Hartford, Connecticut-a picture which it considers to
be typical of other metropolitan areas throughout the country. Id at 4.
44. Commercial banks generally indicated that most of their home mortgage custom-
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common method lenders use for soliciting residential mortgage
applications is courting real estate brokers and builders, keeping
them generally informed of current terms and conditions for
mortgages.4 5 In order to complete sales of property as expedi-
tiously as possible, brokers try to ensure that the loan applicants
they bring to the financial institutions will be acceptable. If bro-
kers avoid presenting a large number of applicants whom the
lenders refuse, they save the lending institution processing costs
and thereby maintain a good business relationship.46
In testing the buyer's acceptability, brokers try to apply the
criteria they think the lenders apply, although they generally have
no way of knowing what the precise standards of the lender are (if
precise standards in fact exist).4 7 Brokers are more skeptical of
the income of blacks than of whites and automatically run credit
checks on minority families, but generally not on white families.48
To show their value to the lending institution, brokers also tend to
be conservative in their referrals. Despite the distortions in the
class of potential buyers that this screening causes, there is evi-
dence that at least some lending institution executives expect bro-
kers to do an initial screening for financial suitability.49
2. The Lending Institution
In the majority of lending institutions, the applicant-buyer first
meets with a loan officer. The loan officer may informally screen
the applicant to determine whether it will be worthwhile for the
potential borrower to make a formal application.5 0  While most
applicants would welcome an objective prescreening to save them-
selves the application fee if they will be refused anyway, the
screening may in fact be based only on subjective feelings rather
than objective criteria. 51 When one considers that the vast major-
ers are present or previous customers, or walk-in customers who are shopping for terms.
Only two of eight commercial banks indicated that they solicit residential mortgage appli-
cants at all.
45. The second most common method of solicitation mentioned was advertising in
newspapers and magazines. The question asked was: "Do you actively solicit home mort-
gage applicants?" Financial Interview, supra note 32, at 1, No. 2. If the answer was
affirmative, the next question asked was: "How do you solicit home mortgage applica-
tions?" Id, No. 2a.
46. See HARTFORD REPORT, supra note 43, at 10-12.
47. See notes 50-67 infra and accompanying text.
48. HARTFORD REPORT, supra note 43, at 10.
49. Id at 11-12.
50. Id at 12-13.
51. Id
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ity of loan officers are white,52 the impressions on which potential
applicants may be screened out may be based as much on
race-of the applicant and of the residents of the area in which
the applicant intends to purchase a home-as on more objective
criteria, such as creditworthiness and the appraised value of the
home.
If applicants pass the informal screening, a formal application
is taken that asks for specific information from the applicant. The
process continues with a credit check and an appraisal of the
property to be mortgaged. Financial institution representatives
indicated that they investigate both the applicant and the property
when they consider a residential mortgage application.5 3 Accord-
ing to the interview responses, the applicant is considered by most
institutions to be of more importance than the property; as one
representative pragmatically observed, "I've never seen a house
make a payment yet."54 The applicant's income is analyzed in
terms of job stability and ability to meet payments, and a check is
made of the applicant's credit record.
Creditworthiness, which the loan officer determines, includes
many subjective judgments. If the lending institution simply uses
information from a credit bureau, it is accepting judgments made
by creditors without learning any of the information on which the
judgments are based." Additional criteria used to determine the
acceptability of an individual for a loan often include arrest
records and history of previous home ownership. These factors
may result in a discriminatory effect on minorities, and have ques-
tionable relevance to the applicant's creditworthiness.5 6
The value of the property which will be the security for the
loan is also determined. A financial institution will either use its
own appraiser or will contract with an independent appraiser to
52. For example, all representatives of financial institutions in the interview popula-
tion were white, with the sole exception of one black-run savings and loan association and
one black-run commercial bank. See also Swindell, Sex Bias Charged at Big Banks, The
Plain Dealer (Cleveland), Feb. 20, 1978, § D, at 10, col. 2 (indicating that in two Cleveland
commercial banks for which information was available, "less than 2% of the officer and
manager positions were filled with black men and the employment of black women in
those categories was so low that it could not be reported statistically .... ").
53. The question asked was: "What factors influence you the most in your decision to
approve a residential loan?" Financial Interview, supra note 32, at 1, No. 3a.
54. Quotation from interview; not attributed in order to maintain confidentiality of
respondents.
55. HARTFORD REPORT, supra note 43, at 15-16.
56. Id at 16.
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determine the value of the home." The two most important crite-
ria used to appraise the residential property are first, the price of
other similar properties recently sold in the area and second, the
condition of the particular property. Also considered by some in-
stitutions are the location and the age of the property. The ques-
tions on the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
(FHLMC) Form 465-8/74 suggest the type of information an ap-
praiser considers." The appraisal provides several opportunities
for the subjective bias of the appraiser to be included in the final
valuation. For instance, form questions ask for an assessment of
"neighborhood compatibility" and "protection from adverse in-
fluences. '59  These designations may relate to concepts of land
use, such as the protection of single family residences by zoning
which excludes multifamily or commercial buildings. However,
appraisers also include concepts like "neighborhood homogene-
ity" and "population homogeneity, '60 allowing for a considera-
tion of the racial characteristics of the community. Moreover, a
presumption of an inevitable neighborhood life cycle is built into
the question whether the "neighborhood trend" is "improving,
stable, or declining."' 61 Improvement, stability, and decline are
words often used to communicate racial information, with stabil-
ity implying no change in racial composition and decline implying
an influx of racial minorities into a previously white area.
Thus, appraisal and creditworthiness, terms that sound objec-
tive, are determined in ways which permit less than unbiased
measurement. After the application, appraisal, and credit check
are complete, the loan officer decides whether to recommend that
the institution make a loan. In some cases where the loans do not
exceed a certain figure, the loan officer may make the final deci-
sion. In most cases, however, the loan officer's decision is re-
57. Appraisers are nearly always white and have been found to consider race in their
reports. Id at 16 n.24.
58. In fact, because so many mortgages originating with local financial institutions are
bought and sold on the secondary mortgage market, which includes FHLMC, the FHLMC
form is a model that appraisers follow. For an overview of the secondary mortgage mar-
ket, see Earthman, Residential Mortgage Lending: Charting a Course Through the Regula-
tory Maze, 29 VAND. L. REv. 957, 973-78 (1976).
59. E.g., Appraisal Report-Individual Condominium or PUD Unit, FHLMC Form
465-8/74, at 2.
60. E. RAMS, RAMS' REAL ESTATE APPRAISING HANDBOOK 264 (1975).
61. E.g., FHLMC Form, supra note 59, at 2. A neighborhood life cycle ending in
decline is inevitable because such inevitability is assumed by actors in the home-lending
process. This becomes part of the self-fulfilling prophecy of neighborhood decline. See
text accompanying notes 72-74 infra.
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viewed by a loan committee, composed of senior officers of the
institution. Interviews indicated that recommendations to the
committee are almost always accepted.62
The reason for the consistent acceptance may be not only that
the loan officers know and follow the institution's policies and
guidelines, but also that the loan officer is expected to err on the
side of conservatism. That is, the loan officer will be more likely
to refuse a loan than to recommend the loan to a committee com-
posed of his superiors, whose approval he is seeking for the pro-
gress of his own career. If the loan officer feels the loan
committee has biases in a certain direction, those biases may be
magnified by the loan officer's self-interest in preventing any
questionable loan applicant from being considered by the senior
officers.63
As noted above, the loan committee and senior officers (who
generally compose the loan committee) play an important role in
determining whether or not an applicant gets a loan. The repre-
sentatives of financial institutions in Cuyahoga County described
lending policies and decisions which are probably typical of other
areas. The boards of directors or bank officers set policy, includ-
ing loan limits, interest rates, and percentage of funds to be in-
vested in residential loans.' These policies are coupled with
general directives against discrimination or otherwise breaking the
law. The loan officer and the real estate broker apply these poli-
cies to their own advantage, within the wide discretion allowed by
the general directives.
In addition to setting policy, the senior officers make final de-
cisions on individual loan applications. In interviews, many indi-
cated that because they review each loan application individually,
they were unaware of their lending pattern until they analyzed the
information that they provided to comply with the HMDA. 65
Again, subjective biases may be exercised at this highest level of
discretionary review. But if the screening process as described
above has been effective, there will be little need for the senior
62. The question which elicited this response was: "Would you please explain in as
much detail as possible the procedure your institution follows in evaluating and approving
or rejecting each home mortgage application?" Financial Interview, supra note 32, at 2,
No. 5.
63. See HARTFORD REPORT, supra note 43, at 13.
64. The question asked was: "How are lending policy decisions made in your institu-
tion?" Financial Interview, supra note 32, at 2, No. 6.
65. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2809 (1976). For other information that financial institutions
learned from their disclosure statements, see note 160 infra and accompanying text.
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officers to refuse loans on the basis of discriminatory criteria,
since those loans that they would refuse for discriminatory reasons
have been already screened out by combinations of bias at preced-
ing levels of the home buying process.
Another important factor which is considered by the financial
institution when a person applies for a mortgage on a house is
how salable the mortgage will be on the secondary mortgage mar-
ket. It is here that the FHLMC appraisal forms and application
forms become important because they indicate the standards for
acceptability on the secondary mortgage market.66 The impor-
tance of the secondary market lies in the role it plays in encourag-
ing a national rather than a local money market. Interviews
indicate that almost all the depository institutions deal with the
secondary mortgage market to some extent. The degree of their
involvement varies tremendously and is a function of policy deci-
sions of the corporation. The involvement of some is mostly in
selling locally originated mortgages in order to have more money
available for loans. Others primarily buy mortgages for invest-
ment purposes. Still others enter the market only occasionally as
particular needs arise.
But as long as a financial institution does deal with, or in the
future may deal with, the secondary mortgage market, then that
institution is not as free to establish its own criteria for deciding
when to make or not make a loan. The guidelines established by
the secondary market for acceptable loans provide the minimum
standards of acceptability. It is necessary, therefore, to prevent
bias from being present or permitted at this level.
D. Summary
By the time a family purchases a particular home, the family's
choice has been channeled and limited by many factors in addi-
tion to what the family needs, wants, and can afford. The deci-
sion as to what house that family may buy has been made by a
series of people, including the seller, the real estate broker, the
loan officer, the appraiser, the institutional officers, and those in-
volved in the secondary mortgage market. Many levels of indi-
vidual judgments allow considerable subjectivity and tremendous
potential for discrimination against particular applicants and
against particular neighborhoods. Each decision can have a cu-
mulative effect with the other decisions so that, whether intended
66. See note 58 supra.
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by the individual decisionmakers or not, the end result may be to
effectively deny mortgage money to groups of individuals and to
neighborhoods, with no business reason (as compared to conven-
ience) to justify the impact.
II. REDLINING
A. Definition
Redlining occurs when financial institutions will not lend in
specific geographic areas. This is the consensus of housing or-
ganizations and financial institutions in Cuyahoga County,67 and
is consistent with definitions in the literature.6 8 This bare bones
definition does little, however, to explain how redlining happens,
why it is of public concern, and what its justification may be.
Redlining is a series of lending decisions on a continuum from
mild increased costs for individual loans to complete refusal to
lend in definite areas. Reports of how redlining occurs include a
large variety of techniques which financial institutions use to dis-
courage loans or to cover perceived increased risks, in addition to
flat-out refusal to lend. In hearings before the Senate Committee
on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, when the Committee
was considering the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, Iii-
67. Over 80% of both financial institutions and housing organizations included this
general concept in their definitions of redlining. In addition, one housing organization and
one financial institution identified redlining as lending on poor terms, while two housing
organizations qualified the definition by saying redlining is granting few or no conven-
tional loans in an area. One housing organization said a redlined area was one which was
not getting at least 50% of its savings deposits returned in loans.
Four financial institutions said that redlining does not exist, or that they did not know
what it was, or that it was a term that community groups and the media use to blame
financial institutions for problems. One said redlining is the refusal of insurance compa-
nies to grant fire insurance in an area. The term "redlining" is purported to have originated
from the practice of drawing a red circle on a map around areas in which insurance compa-
nies would not issue policies. The practice of not providing insurance is still occurring and
is a form of redlining different from the mortgage redlining discussed.
68. See, e.g., Wisniewski, Mortgage Redlining (Disinvestment): The Parameters of Fed-
eral, State, and Municipal Regulation, 54 J. OF URB. L. 367, 367 (1977) (Redlining is defimed
as "the denial of mortgage loans in a particular geographic area for home purchase, expan-
sion, or remodeling, regardless of the credit of the applicant or quality of the prop-
erty. ... ); Note, Urban Housing Finance and the Redlining Controversy, 25 CLCV. ST. L.
REv. 110, 110 (1976) ("While the essence of redlining is geographical discrimination in
home loans, most definitions of redlining fall into two general categories." These are "ra-
cial redlining" and "economic redlining."). Redlining is also seen as a "principal tactic in
disinvestment," in that it is "a series of progressive steps by which area lending institutions
extricate themselves from neighborhoods they predict will deteriorate." A. NAPARSTEIK &
G. CINCOTTA, URBAN DISINVESTMENr. NEw IMPLICATIONS FOR COMMUNITY ORGANIZA-
TION, RESEARCH, AND PUBLIC POLICY 8 (1976).
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nois Governor Dan Walker listed the following eleven different
ways in which redlining may take place:69
1. Requiring down payments of a higher amount than are
usually required for financing comparable properties in
other areas;
2. Fixing loan interest rates in amounts higher than those set
for all or most other mortgages in other areas;
3. Fixing loan closing costs in amounts higher than those set
for all or most other mortgages in other areas;
4. Fixing loan maturities below the number of years to ma-
turity set for all or most other mortgages in other areas;
5. Refusing to lend on properties above a prescribed maxi-
mum number of years of age;
6. Refusing to make loans in dollar amounts below a certain
minimum figure, thus excluding many of the lower-priced
properties often found in neighborhoods where redlining
is practiced;
7. Refusing to lend on the basis of presumed "economic ob-
solescence" no matter what the conditions of an older
property may be;
8. Stalling on appraisals to discourage potential borrowers;
9. Setting appraisals in amounts below what market value
actually should be, thus making home purchase transac-
tions more difficult to accomplish;7
0
10. Applying structural appraisal standards of a much more
rigid nature than those applied for comparable properties
in other areas;
11. Charging discount "points" as a way of discouraging fi-
nancing.7 1
Additional examples of subtle redlining practices include commit-
ting mortgage money to future developments, thus restricting the
present supply available for individuals, and relocating financial
institutions, making them less accessible to applicants in the for-
mer location.72
B. The Effects of Redlining
Redlining is an important phenomenon because of its effects.
Many commentators consider redlining to be a self-fulfilling
69. Hearings on S. 1281 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban
.4ffairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1975) (footnotes added) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
70. See notes 58-61 supra and accompanying text.
71. Discount points are a means to avoid upper limits on interest rates imposed by the
law by requiring that the buyer actually pay higher interest rates than are shown on the
record. For a more complete description of the practice, see Note, supra note 34, at 999
n.67.
72. See Note, supra note 3 1, at 73.
1090 [Vol. 28:1074
HMDA1
prophecy of neighborhood decline.73 When financial institutions
consider an area to be a greater risk than another area- or alter-
natively, when they perceive one area to be more attractive for
investment than another area-their decisions on lending will re-
flect those perceptions. As noted earlier, various decisionmakers
within financial institutions have great latitude in choosing from
the various applicants and in selecting the properties they want to
accept as collateral. In addition, the policymakers can set priori-
ties for lending that will reflect unfavorably on particular areas.
Once financial institutions become more or less reluctant to
lend in an area, resulting in decisions that connote a perceived loss
in investment attractiveness, a process sets in that almost inevita-
bly leads to progressive decline and deterioration, resulting in dis-
investment of the entire neighborhood. This process
characteristically occurs in stages over a period of several years.
Six phases of neighborhood deterioration are described by a
Cleveland housing organization.74 First, a healthy neighborhood
exists with strong demand for housing and readily available fi-
nancing. Second, subtle symptoms of redlining appear, such as
changes in loan terms, as local lenders begin to move their credit
elsewhere because of a "funny feeling" about the neighborhood.
Third, redlining by neighborhood lenders becomes obvious as
loans for purchase and home improvement are refused. This re-
sults in an inability to maintain present properties; an exodus of
businesses and of socially mobile residents begins. Fourth, the
larger downtown institutions also refuse to lend. With only FHA
insured mortgages available speculators will "turn over" the area.
Fifth, spiraling deterioration takes hold with abandoned housing,
increased rentals, no maintenance, no property insurance, and de-
clining city services. Sixth, urban renewal moves in to squeeze
out the poor with housing for the well-to-do.
Similar results from redlining were described by other
Cuyahoga County housing organizations when they were asked
what happens to a redlined area. Almost one-half of the organi-
zations replied that maintenance of houses virtually ceases and
73. Eg, Bradford & Rubinowitz, The Urban-Suburban Investment-Disinvestment
Process: Consequencesfor Older Neighborhoods, 422 ANNALS 86 (1975).
74. Citizens Action Program, The Phases of Neighborhood Deterioration (Mimeo-
graphed paper received from a housing organization in the survey). The same sequence of
disinvestment is described in Reinvestment Committee of Milwaukee Alliance of Con-
cerned Citizens, Red-lining on Milwaukee's Westside; see Hearings, supra note 69, at 293,
295-300.
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that people move out.75 This is the third phase of the process of
deterioration described above-the first step after local lenders
begin to redline. One-fifth to one-quarter of the organizations
said that neighborhoods decline generally, fewer city services are
provided, much vacant and vandalized housing appears, and
much speculation occurs. As noted previously, and confirmed by
two organizations, the last two symptoms may often occur in con-
junction with an influx of FHA loans. Organizations also men-
tioned the phase five characteristics of an increased number of
rentals and increased population density.7 6 The housing organi-
zations drew a composite picture: as money is pulled out of an
area by the banks' refusal to invest, the banks' expectation of dete-
rioration is fulfilled. The area loses its ability to attract home-
owners as money for housing becomes less available. Because
houses cannot be easily bought and sold, their market value goes
down. Then absentee owners buy the houses and put them to
other uses until they become virtually valueless for private use.
C. Why Does Redlining Occur?
A brochure that a savings and loan association distributes to
its customers indicates the choice that it perceives itself compelled
to make when deciding whether or not to lend.77 It can either
make a loan considered risky according to its discretionary stand-
ards, or refuse to loan, thereby maximizing the association's prof-
its at the expense of the community's financial health. The
institution "must weigh the social merit of any loan application
against our fiduciary responsibility to protect the value of your sav-
ings-and the savings of thousands of others. Our obligation to
our savers must come first."7 8  In practical effect, a loan that
might risk depositors' savings must be refused. The institutions'
representatives are naturally most concerned about their fiduciary
responsibilities to their depositors and stockholders. They react to
those relatively well-defined responsibilities first and wait for gov-
ernment regulatory agencies to define more clearly their legal ob-
75. Additional responses indicated that in general, money is drawn out of the area, the
tax base diminishes as property fails to appreciate in value, bank withdrawal fulfills the
expectation of deterioration, and the area loses its ability to attract people.
76. Each of these characteristics was mentioned by two organizations.
77. State Savings and Loan Company, Report to Savers... About Mortgage Loan
Disclosure and our Lending Policies (1976).
78. Id A lender in the present survey remarked that "we cannot convert the banking
business into a social agency." He added that instead perhaps the definition of good busi-
ness judgment ought to be changed.
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ligations in areas of social concern.79
One measure lenders use to evaluate the risk to investment
capital is the foreclosure rate. If the borrower defaults on the
loan, the ultimate recourse to recover the money lent is to fore-
close. Because foreclosure entails considerable cost to the institu-
tion for administrative and legal fees, lenders interviewed
indicated that they try to avoid foreclosure whenever possible,
even when a loan is in serious default."0 Two-thirds of the lend-
ers interviewed experienced a foreclosure rate during the last fis-
cal year of considerably less than one percent. An additional
twenty percent had no foreclosures at all.8 '
In fact, many see the practice of redlining as beneficial to some
people or institutions. Most housing organizations and some fi-
nancial institutions in the Cuyahoga County survey indicated that
redlining benefits someone.8 2 Commercial banks and savings
and loan associations and their depositors were mentioned most
often as the beneficiaries.8 3 Additional beneficiaries mentioned
were insurance companies, mortgage companies,8 4 real estate bro-
kers, 5 speculators, 6 and the FHA (in previous years).87
79. For a brief analysis of what those social obligations may be at this time, see notes
118-25 infra and accompanying text.
80. This hesitancy is in marked contrast to swift FHA foreclosure where the costs of
foreclosure are paid by the government. See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
81. One savings and loan association, which gives no indication that its profitability is
jeopardized, continues to concentrate its lending in the older areas of the county where its
branches are located. It stated that its foreclosure rate is "a little higher than average"
because of the lending it does in "mostly dilapidated areas" of the county, but gave no
basis for its comparison. A study conducted in Pittsburgh indicates that loans within the
central city are generally more risky than loans to the outlying areas. Williams, Beranck, &
Kenkel, Factors Affecting Risk in Urban Areas-A Pittsburgh Prototype Analysis,
Hearings, supra note 69, at 628.
82. Eighty percent of the housing organizations and twenty-four percent of the fman-
cial institutions indicated this.
83. Ten of the twelve housing organizations which indicated that someone benefits,
mentioned one or more of these categories, as did five of the seven financial institutions.
84. Mortgage companies, as a source of nonconventional capital for buying homes,
are considered by many to be speculators, looking for the "fast buck." They do not oper-
ate extensively in an area until some degree of redlining by conventional lenders has made
their financing necessary. See, e.g., National Training and Information Center, Federal
Housing Administration: The American Nightmare (1976).
85. Real estate brokers profit by selling houses. When a large volume of houses are
sold quickly in an area because of a quick turnover of FHA housing (often the major
source of residential financing because of redlining), the real estate brokers profit from the
increased sales.
86. Speculators include those who are looking to make quick profits in any stage of
the home buying process, without regard for the consequences to the neighborhood.
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Lenders perceive risks when they are asked to lend in certain
areas. Although concerned citizens may say that financial institu-
tions which redline cause urban disinvestment, the profile that fi-
nancial institutions in the survey gave of areas in which they
would expect redlining to occur indicates that the areas where
they will not lend have already begun to be disinvested, in the
sense of not having sufficient money to prevent deterioration.
88
For instance, lack of maintenance was the factor mentioned by
almost one-half the lenders.89  High crime, vandalism, or fires
When conventional kinds of financing are not available, however, speculators may be the
only source of financing.
87. One institution indicated that this was an expedient means of screening loans. In
fact, FHA standards used to require racial redlining and racially restrictive covenants.
U.S. FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION, UNDERWRITING MANUAL: UNDERWRITING
AND VALUATION PROCEDURE UNDER TITLE II OF THE NATIONAL HOUSING ACT (1938).
88. The question asked was: "What are the major characteristics of an area in which
one would expect redlining to occur?" L. McKinney & P. Pap, Community Organizations
Interview Form at 10, No. 20 (1977) (unpublished questionnaire on file in Case Western
Reserve University School of Law Library); L. McKinney & P. Pap, Financial Institutions
Interview Form at 5, No. 24 (1977) (unpublished questionnaire on file in Case Western
Reserve University School of Law Library). Nine of the twenty-nine respondents to this
question indicated either that redlining does not exist or that they did not know where it
would occur. The responses may be graphically illustrated as follows:
FINANCIAL
INSTITUTI(
Rank (percer
1 (48%)
2 (31%)
3.5 (17%)
COMPARATIVE IMPORTANCE OF FACTORS
ASSOCIATED WITH THE EXISTENCE OF REDLINING
HOUSING
ONS FACTOR ORGANIZATIONS
t mentioned) Rank (percent mentioned)
lack of maintenance 4 (27%)
high crime, vandalism, fires not mentioned
large number renters, absentee 4 (27%)
3.5 (17%)
5.5 (14%)
5.5 (14%)
8 (10%)
8 (10%)
8 (10%)
Not mentioned
landlords
poor city services
poorer residents
older properties
ethnically or racially polarized
or changing
vacant and vandalized homes
lack of pride; poor social
cohesion
older residents
4 (27%)
2 (60%)
6 (13%)
1 (67%)
6 (13%)
not mentioned
6 (13%)
89. See table, note 88 supra.
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were important to almost one-third 0 A large number of renters,
absentee landlords, and poor city services (including poor schools)
were cited by one-sixth of the respondents.9 1 Older properties
were important to one-seventh, as were poorer residents.92 Fac-
tors mentioned by any three of the financial institutions were: va-
cant and vandalized homes, lack of pride or poor social cohesion
of the residents, and an ethnically or racially polarized or chang-
ing neighborhood.93 All of these factors describe neighborhoods
which have begun to decline.
Interestingly, housing organizations articulated a different
community profile when asked where they would expect redlining
to occur.94 Racial or ethnic polarization or change was men-
tioned by two-thirds of the housing organizations, as compared to
only three financial institutions.95 Poor residents were also men-
tioned by almost two-thirds of the housing organizations, as com-
pared to one-seventh of the financial institutions.96 Lack of
maintenance, poor city services, and a large number of renters and
absentee landlords were next in aggregate number of those factors
mentioned, but they were well below the first two categories.
Each of these was among the six factors most often mentioned by
the financial institutions.97
Thus, the financial institutions' composite description of areas
in which they expected redlining included poorly maintained
homes, high incidence of crime destructive to property, large
numbers of renters with less incentive to maintain their resi-
dences,98 and little support from the city to maintain the quality of
living. Presumably, these factors are what lenders consider when
they make a decision on whether to loan in a particular area.
In comparison, the housing organizations' descriptions focused
90. See id
91. See id
92. See id
93. Other factors mentioned by only one or two institutions were whether the area was
a complete slum, whether it was changing from residential to industrial, whether it had a
high density, and whether there was insurance available. None of these factors were men-
tioned by any of the housing organizations.
94. See table, note 88 supra.
95. Id
96. Id
97. Id
98. See Note, Attacking the Urban Redlining Problem, 56 B.U. L. REv. 989, 998
(1976).
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more on the residents than on the properties.99 In redlined areas
the residents were racially or ethnically polarized or in rapid tran-
sition, creating anxieties in the neighborhood. Also, they were
poorer than those in nonredlined areas. The other characteristics
of the neighborhood were similar to those described by the finan-
cial institutions, with one exception. Crime, the factor most often
cited by the financial institutions, was mentioned only tangen-
tially by housing organizations; vandalism was mentioned only as
a corollary to the increased incidence of vacant houses.
All these factors, however are held out by financial institu-
tions to justify decisions not to lend in an area. The perceived
high rate of property crime is a risk to the real property which is
collateral for the loan. Also, lack of maintenance in the sur-
rounding area tends to lower the appraised value of the house to
be purchased, even if the particular structure is well maintained.
Renters and absentee landlords have less incentive to maintain
their housing than do resident homeowners; and, as maintenance
deteriorates, the neighbors' incentive to maintain decreases as the
value of their houses is reduced by those that are poorly main-
tained. In addition, older properties require more maintenance,
and when families are poorer, they have fewer resources to meet
the increased costs of upkeep. Poor city services also make the
area less attractive than areas where services are better and the
quality of living is improved by better safety, sewers, and schools.
The unattractive neighborhood lowers the sale value of properties
and affects the appraised value of the particular property the ap-
plicant wants to buy.
The characteristics that were given varying emphasis by the
financial institutions and the housing organizations are not neces-
sarily mutually exclusive. While the emphases are different, the
picture that each gives could easily contain the elements that the
other depicts. This observation is supported by the fact that,
when asked about redlining in Cuyahoga County, there was gen-
eral consensus in the description of areas where it occurs.' °
While all respondents did not describe exactly the same locations,
99. This is interesting, considering the lenders' professed preoccupation with the bor-
rowers. See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
100. Forty-eight percent of the financial institutions indicated that redlining does not
exist or that they do not know whether it exists in Cuyahoga County. All housing organi-
zations responded that it does exist, and all but one said it occurs in their organizational
service areas. The geographical areas of redlining were described by the financial institu-
tions' answers to several questions.
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the areas described were in parts of the county which are predomi-
nantly black or interracial. No respondents suggested that identi-
fiably white areas are being redlined. Thus, while financial
institutions did not mention race as an important characteristic in
a redlined area, race is an obvious factor. In fact, in view of the
subjective judgments that are made by individuals in the institu-
tional decisionmaking sequence, 10 1 the race of a neighborhood
may encourage the decisionmaker to presuppose the existence of
the other characteristics.
Yet, whatever the reason for redlining, because the process has
such a significant impact on large sections of our country's cities,
the question must be asked whether these private decisions by
quasi-public lending institutions may be permitted to continue to
cause the public the harm that results. Senator Proxmire, chair-
man of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs, highlighted the public aspect of lending institutions when
he observed that they "are not chartered simply to make as much
money as they can. . . .They have certain privileges, such as fed-
eral insurance and a partial monopoly. In exchange for these
privileges, they have obligations. One such obligation is to serve
their service area."'' 0 2
D. The Legality of Redlining
There is current federal law which may be used to penalize
those who redline on the basis of race. Recently a federal district
court 10 3 held that refusal to make loans in areas in which minority
groups are concentrated violates Title VIII of the Fair Housing
Act of 1968.104 Title VIII proscribes racial discrimination in the
sale or rental of housing'05 and in the financing of housing, 0 6 and
protects against interference with an individual's right to volun-
tary, interracial association.0 7 The district court also found that
defendant's actions, on a motion for summary judgment, violated
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,108 which prohibits dis-
crimination by any program or activity receiving federal financial
101. See notes 42-66 supra and accompanying text.
102. 121 CONG. REc. 25161 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Proxmire).
103. Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co., 408 F. Supp. 489 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
104. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
105. Id. § 3604 (Supp. V 1975).
106. Id § 3605.
107. Id. § 3617 (1970).
108. 1d. § 2000d (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
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assistance. Because the defendant building and loan association
was a member of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board system, the
1964 Civil Rights Act was held applicable.
The Civil Rights Act of 1866109 may be another statutory basis
for attacking financial institutions which redline. Its language
states that all citizens have the same rights as white citizens to buy
real property. This section has been interpreted by the Supreme
Court to prohibit "all racial discrimination, private as well as
public, in the sale or rental of property.""i 0
A number of states and cities have instituted legislation or reg-
ulations to control redlining."' For example, an Illinois stat-
ute 2 specifically prohibits denying or varying the terms of a loan
"on the basis that a specific parcel of real estate offered as security
is located in a specific geographical area."' " This is a classic def-
inition of redlining. Under this statute, a financial institution also
may not "utilize lending standards that have no economic basis
and which are discriminatory in effect."' '14 This second proscrip-
tion would be a difficult standard to use to control lenders, since
financial institutions argue that any change in the present process
would prevent them from carrying out sound economic proce-
dures. The more appropriate question may be whether the eco-
nomic basis is sufficiently strong to justify the effect of the lending
standards.
A practical difficulty with statutes allowing private causes of
action to control redlining is the delay involved in litigation. An
individual who brings suit because he was refused credit to
purchase a house will probably not be able to buy that particular
house by the time the suit has been successfully concluded. The
109. Id. § 1982 (1970).
110. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968) (emphasis in the original).
In this landmark case, the Supreme Court found that the 1866 statute prohibited discrimi-
nation by private, as well as state actors. Previously, the statute had been read to apply
only to state action.
An alternate approach to attacking redlining, using § I of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1 (1976), focuses on the anticompetitive rather than the racial effects of redlining activi-
ties. Liability under this statute would result from finding a combination or conspiracy to
restrain trade or commerce. Comment, Redlining: Potential Civil Rights and Sherman Act
Violations Raised by Lending Policies, 8 IND. L. REv. 1053 (1975).
111. For the details of various legislative and regulatory efforts, see Wisniewski, supra
note 68, at 394-402.
112. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95, §§ 201-307.
113. Id § 304(a). The problems of proving an allegation based on the statutory lan-
guage are immense.
114. Id § 304(d).
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time between the refusal of a loan application and the conclusion
of a suit will exceed the number of days generally allowed for
securing financing in a purchase agreement. If financing is not
found within that time, the purchase agreement is void and the
seller may sell to anyone else. Since the seller is not responsible
for the buyer's inability to obtain credit, there would be no reason
to cause the seller additional injury by preventing the sale of the
house to another until the litigation is resolved. Thus, one impor-
tant incentive for filing suit against the financial institution for
redlining is removed. This is particularly true if there is a chance
of obtaining financing for another house in another location. Af-
ter all, the basic goal of the prospective buyer is to actually
purchase a house in whatever way is practical.
The Housing Act of 1949,115 the Civil Rights Act of 1964,116
and the Fair Housing Act of 1968 7 all mandate that departments
and agencies of the federal government use their powers to facili-
tate and further the acts' purposes. At present, this mandate is
not being fulfilled in the area of redlining. Four federal agencies
regulate the financial institutions which provide most of the funds
for home financing in this country. They are the Comptroller of
the Currency, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve, and the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation." 8  In addition, the government has established
quasi-public instrumentalities to promote liquidity in the home
mortgage market." 9 The federal government is also involved in
private, nonsubsidized residential lending by insuring mortgages
through the FHA and the Veterans Administration (VA).' 20
Loans insured by the FHA provide an opportunity to obtain home
115. 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970).
116. Id. § 2000d-I (Supp. V 1975).
117. Id. § 3608(c) (1970).
118. The respective duties of these agencies have been summarized as follows:
The Comptroller of the Currency regulates national banks, the Federal Re-
serve Board regulates state-chartered commercial banks which are members of
the Federal Reserve System, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation reg-
ulates the remainder of the state-chartered commercial banks. The Federal Home
Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) comprehensively regulates federally-chartered sav-
ings and loan associations that insure deposits with the Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation. Of all federal regulatory agencies, the FHLBB has the
greatest impact upon urban home loans.
Note, Urban Housing Finance andthe Redlining Controversy, 25 CLEV. ST. L. Rnv. 110, 123
(1976).
119. See Earthman, Residential Mortgage Lending: Charting a Course Through the Reg-
ulatory Maze, 29 VAND. L. REv. 957, 973-78 (1976).
120. See notes 36-38 supra and accompanying text.
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financing when conventional financing is not available, but be-
cause of the way FHA financing has been administered it has con-
tributed to, rather than alleviated, many of the problems
associated with redlining. 12
1
Regulations by the regulatory bodies have begun to address
the redlining problem. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board has
issued policy statements and regulations which indicate that lend-
ing institution practices that have the effect of discrimination vio-
late the law, even if there is no intent to discriminate. 22
Nevertheless, the regulations allow standards with discriminatory
effect if they achieve "a genuine business need." '123 The Federal
Reserve Board has issued a statement that it will allow an institu-
tion to "take an active role in the quest for solutions to the na-
tion's social problems" by engaging in "projects designed
primarily to promote community welfare."' 24 It is not apparent
from this statement whether socially responsible investment activ-
ity is an affirmative obligation of an institution, but it is at least
permissible. The four regulatory agencies have also been work-
ing together to collect information about the problems involved in
fair housing.'25
The regulatory agencies have the power to ensure that finan-
cial institutions serve their communities. Since they have broad
regulatory power over the major lending institutions in the coun-
try, they should also assume the major responsibilities for cor-
recting practices that clash with national housing objectives as
declared by Congress. At least partially because the regulatory
agencies have not been active in this area, Congress passed the
1975 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act to deal more specifically
with the problem of redlining. I2
6
121. See notes 36-41 supra and accompanying text.
122. 12 C.F.R. § 531.8 (1975). As the Laufman court indicated, these Federal Home
Loan Bank Board regulations were developed to interpret the Fair Housing Act of 1968.
408 F. Supp. 489, 494 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
123. 12 C.F.R. § 531.8(b) (1975) (amendments to 12 C.F.R. §§ 528 and 531.8 became
effective July 1 and September 1, 1978, respectively, 43 Fed. Reg. 22, 332 (1978)). See
note 186 infra.
124. 12 C.F.R. §§ 225-227 (1976).
125. See, e.g., COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, FAIR HOUSING LENDING PRACTICES
PILOT PROJECT, SURVEY C APPROACH (1975).
126. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2809 (1976).
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III. THE HOME MORTGAGE DISCLOSURE ACT
A. The Purpose of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
Congress found that "some depository institutions have some-
times contributed to the decline of certain geographic areas by
their failure pursuant to their chartering responsibilities to provide
adequate home financing to qualified applicants on reasonable
terms and conditions."' 27 The stated purpose of the HMDA is
"to provide citizens and public officials. . . with sufficient infor-
mation to enable them to determine whether depository institu-
tions are filling their obligations to serve the housing needs of the
communities and neighborhoods in which they are located."'' 2
8
Section 302(a) of the HMDA reflects Congress' belief that de-
pository institutions have responsibilities under their charter to
provide adequate home financing to qualified applicants on rea-
sonable terms and conditions. This legal obligation is based on
the fact that these institutions are required to demonstrate that
any new office or branch they propose to establish is necessary to
meet the conveniences and needs of the local community.129 The
information to be reported under the HMDA will provide means
by which to evaluate whether financial institutions are meeting
the bona fide needs of the community in which they were
chartered. 30
This congressional emphasis on the obligation of a depository
institution to serve its local community is contrary to other trends
in banking law. While governmental regulation of the banking
and lending industry has steadily increased over the years, restric-
tions as to the area in which an institution may operate have
eroded. 31 Charters once limited an institution's activities to a 20-
mile radius; now the same institution may lend anywhere in the
state.' 32 The Federal Home Loan Bank Board has long had the
authority to monitor the activities of federal savings and loan as-
sociations within their communities, but the Board has never exer-
127. Id § 2801(a).
128. Id § 2801(b). The Uniform Depository Act in Ohio prohibits public officials
from making deposit decisions based on disclosure information because of bidding require-
ments set out in the Act. OHIio REv. CODE ANN. §§ 135.01-.09 (Page Supp. 1978).
129. S. RaP. No. 187, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 11 (1975); see note 102 supra and accompa-
nying text.
130. H.R. REP. No. 561, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 13, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 2303, 2315.
131. See, e.g., Ohio Am. Sub. S.B. 256, Ohio Branch Banking Bill.
132. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1111.03(A) (Page 1967).
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cised this power. 133  The financial institutions interviewed,
without exception, viewed their primary charter responsibility as
protecting the interests of their depositors. None mentioned an
obligation to ensure that adequate home financing was available
to the residents of the neighborhood in which it was located.
Part of the problem of urban disinvestment may lie in the for-
midable reputations of the depository institutions. Lenders inter-
viewed in Cuyahoga County frequently asserted that home
mortgage and home improvement loans are available to all finan-
cially qualified persons who want them. But the bewildering in-
tricacy of lending procedures, supported by popular mythology, as
to the requisites of a successful loan applicant, is probably as im-
portant as any other single factor in limiting the amount of home
loan dollars which flow into our older city neighborhoods. Resi-
dents do not think they can get a loan, do not apply for one, and
therefore do not get one. The need for community education to
dispel these myths is clear. Less clear is the responsibility of fi-
nancial institutions themselves to provide some of this education.
It is perhaps easier and more profitable for lenders to follow the
road to new suburban developments for their business. Yet the
institutional charters require that they take other considerations
into account. Financial institutions have more than one set of
obligations and responsibilities. 134  With the the passage of the
HMDA, Congress recognized that
there have been too many instances in which financial institu-
tions have denied credit where it was not necessitated by the
responsibility of the institution to vouchsafe the safety of de-
positor funds. There have been too many instances where ar-
bitrary decisions have been made by financial institutions
without even an appraisal .... There have been too many in-
stances where home improvement loans, mortgage loans for
homes in the $10,000 to $15,000 category have not been made
because they were not "profitable," not because they were
"risky." 35
The Act requires all depository institutions which are federally li-
censed or insured and which make federally related mortgage
loans, to report publicly the dollar amount and location of all con-
ventional and FHA and VA insured mortgage loans made during
133. H.R. REP. No. 561, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 13, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 2303, 2315.
134. Id at 19, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2320-21.
135. Id at 20, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2321.
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the previous fiscal year." 6 Local residents and community
groups may use loan distribution information as a tool to en-
courage greater investment in their neighborhoods. As the
United States League of Savings Associations observed, "Funda-
mentally what is involved here is that if your disclosure statement
creates interest on the part of your savers, the general public and
the media, you will be required to justify your lending pat-
terns." 137  The other side of that coin is well illustrated by two
savings and loan associations which have worked in conjunction
with local community groups to carry out promotional advertising
campaigns in separate Cleveland neighborhoods. These two
lenders have set an example for expanding investment in these
and other urban areas. Both have received widespread promo-
tion for their "community-mindedness." Such advertising and
increased good will may be an added incentive to spur other insti-
tutions to lend in older neighborhoods.
Congress anticipated this result in passing the HMDA. It
hoped that "once depositors are aware of the lending policies of
institutions in their communities, marketplace competition will
lead lenders to become more community-minded and mortgage
credit will become more plentiful in older neighborhoods."'' 38
Any shift in savings patterns would be closely scrutinized by fi-
nancial institutions and changes in their lending practices would
likely result.
B. Use of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act by Housing
Organizations
Mortgage loan disclosure statements were required by law to
be available for the first time on September 30, 1976.' 31
Cuyahoga County's community housing organizations dubbed
136. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve may exempt from federal disclo-
sure requirements any state chartered depository institution within a state which has sub-
stantially similar disclosure legislation with adequate enforcement provisions. 12 U.S.C.
§ 2805 (1976).
137. W. O'Connell, Presenting Mortgage Loan Data to the Public, United Savings
League Special Management Bulletin 166, at 1 (July 26, 1976).
138. S. REP. No. 187, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1975). Senator Proxmire stated it even
more directly 'vhen he explained that "[t]he idea, frankly, is that many customers would
favor institutions that kept at least some money in the community." Hearings on S. 1281
Before the Senate ComnL on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
139. 12 C.F.R. § 203.5 (1976).
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this momentous occasion "hit day.' 14' They identified thirty-five
lending institutions active in the county, apportioned these institu-
tions among themselves, and systematically appeared at each in-
stitution's main office on that morning.
The symbolic importance of that first "disclosure" was ample
incentive for groups to take the time to personally traverse the
county collecting disclosure statements. That initial enthusiasm
had waned by the second disclosure deadline. Fewer groups
helped collect statements, and the process took more than one
day. Some institutions were contacted by mail instead of in per-
son. The fact is that mortgage loan disclosure statements are dif-
ficult to analyze. Furthermore, once analyzed, the data are
inadequate to clearly document redlining. For example, there is
no measure of the demand for loans in a particular part of the
community at a particular institution. Nearly one-half the hous-
ing organizations which analyzed the data agreed that the infor-
mation provided was insufficient to establish the actual existence
of redlining. 4' The hours needed to make any sense out of the
raw data seem to be wasted when findings derived from the dis-
closure statements are countered with: "But no one from that part
of town asked us for a mortgage loan."
On the other hand, housing organizations do know whether or
not people are trying to buy homes in their service area. Commu-
nity group respondents recounted story after story of persons de-
nied loans because the house was "on the wrong end of the street,"
"in a risky area," "built before World War II," and so on. As-
suming, then, that demand for homes in these areas exists, some
groups have used the data provided in the disclosure statements to
make several different evaluations of lending practices.
One-half of those who identified redlining as a primary focus
of their activity had completed their own analysis of the disclosure
140. When asked: "Were you or was someone in your organization involved in the
passage of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act?," more than half the housing organizations
indicated that they were. L. McKinney & P. Pap, Community Organizations Interview
Form at 13, No. 27 (1977) (unpublished questionnaire on file in Case Western Reserve
University School of Law Library) [hereinafter cited as Community Interview]. Most
often this involvement took the form of lobbying public officials on federal, state, and local
levels, testifying at public hearings, and generally making contact with public officials, the
media, and financial institutions to raise awareness about redlining. For a description of
the housing organizations involved in the study, see note 9 supra and accompanying text.
141. The questions asked were: "What do you see as the major purpose of the Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act? Do you believe that the Act satisfies this major purpose, or do
you feel that the Act fails to satisfy this purpose?" Id at 15, Nos. 36 & 37.
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data. 142 The simplest and most common comparison made was
to note the number of loans made by each financial institution in
their service area. Then the number of loans made by each insti-
tution in that area was compared from one disclosure period to
the next. Some groups looked at financial institutions with
branches in their community and compared the number and dol-
lar amounts of mortgage loans made there with the same figures
for that institution in neighboring communities. Often the differ-
ence between the communities was their racial composition.
Home improvement loans in each neighborhood were compared
in the same way.
A more sophisticated variation of this measure was created by
one housing organization. A rough estimate of the expected
number of mortgage loans granted in the community was derived
by finding the percentage of dwelling units in the county that were
located in the particular inner ring suburb. Then the total
number of mortgages granted by each institution in the suburb
was compared to those granted in the county as a whole. This
percentage was measured against the predictor, to evaluate the ad-
equacy of a specific institution's investment in the community.
A third kind of analysis made by some housing organizations
was to compare the number of conventional mortgages to the
number of government insured mortgages made by each financial
institution on single family homes in the neighborhood. Going
one step further, at least one group then compared the number of
government insured mortgages in the area to the number of VA
and FHA foreclosures. This last measurement was intended to il-
lustrate the special problems a community faces when the inci-
dence of government insured mortgages is high.
Community housing organizations found an imaginative vari-
ety of uses for their findings from the mortgage loan disclosure
statements. 143 Apparently, these findings need not be sophisti-
cated to be effective bargaining tools with financial institutions. In
turn, most financial institutions interviewed see community hous-
ing organizations as central to the process of identifying and deal-
142. The questions asked were: "Have you analyzed the data which you obtained? Af-
ter analyzing the home mortgage disclosure data, what were your findings?" Id. at 14-15,
Nos. 35 & 35b.
143. The question asked was: "Did you subsequently use the findings of your analysis
for any specific purpose? What was that purpose? How did you accomplish or attempt to
accomplish this purpose? What were the results of this?" Id at 15, Nos. 35c-35f.
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ing with redlining.' 4 A quarter of the financial institutions
specifically suggested that neighborhood groups provide the impe-
tus needed for upgrading the quality of city neighborhoods by en-
couraging home improvements, building community pride, and
negotiating with lenders. This may in part be a "pass the buck"
approach, but it appears to be backed by a genuine willingness to
cooperate on reinvestment programs with neighborhood groups
and city officials. This is in keeping with the congressional objec-
tive to "provide a vehicle for neighborhood residents, public offi-
cials, and financial institutions to enter into partnerships with
each other in joint efforts to plan reinvestment strategies for de-
clining neighborhoods."'' 45  The psychological impact of "disclo-
sure" on lenders may have engendered a willingness to listen to
the concerns of community groups. Perhaps the national debate
on redlining and the mere passage of the HMDA have gone a long
way toward fulfilling the congressional purpose despite inadequa-
cies in the disclosures required by the HMDA.
Nearly all of the housing organizations interviewed reported
having met with individual lending institutions to negotiate in-
creased lending in their neighborhoods. 46  Two-thirds of all fi-
nancial institutions interviewed had had contact with a
community group to discuss lending practices and procedures. 47
In eighty percent of these cases, lenders felt that the contact was
144. This statement was in response to the question: "Assuming that one of the pur-
poses of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act is to encourage reinvestment in residential
areas where loans have not been readily available, what suggestions would you have to
accomplish that purpose?" L. McKinney & P. Pap, Financial Institutions Interview Form
at 9, No. 45 (1977) (unpublished questionnaire on file in Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Library) [hereinafter cited as Financial Interview].
145. H.R. REP. No. 561, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 14, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2303, 2315.
146. The questions asked were:
-Has your community group had any contact with lending institutions, with re-
spect to the redlining issue, in the past two years?
-With approximately how many different lending institutions have you had such
contact during this two year period?
-With whom were your three most recent contacts?
-Could you please describe your contact with (1, 2, 3), including your intentions
prior to the contact, what occurred during the contact, and the results of the
contact?
Community Interview, supra note 140, at 4, Nos. 14-14c.
147. The questions asked were: "Community groups have increasingly taken an inter-
est in the lending practices of financial institutions in their neighborhoods. Have you had
any contacts with a community group? Would you please describe the contact(s)? Would
you rate your contacts as being a positive, negative, or neutral experience? Why?" Finan-
cial Interview, supra note 144, at 8, Nos. 44-44b.
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positive.' 48  A ten percent negative response can be attributed to
the confrontational sit-in style of one community housing organi-
zation.1 4
9
Community housing organizations often used these meetings
with lenders to inform lenders of their lending practices, as they
appeared from the disclosure statements, and to ascertain the in-
stitution's concern with lending in the community. These hous-
ing organizations often reported back to city government with the
aim of encouraging city officials to pressure the financial institu-
tions to increase investment in the neighborhood.' 50 Toward this
end, housing organizations have made two basic recommenda-
tions to city governments in Cuyahoga County: first, that addi-
tional city disclosure legislation be considered and second, that
city funds be deposited only in financial institutions that have
contributed positively to the growth of the community or that
have made commitments for increased lending.'
5
'
These initial meetings have led, in some instances, to the crea-
tion of an ongoing relationship between the lender, the housing
organization, and the city. One good example, from a Cleveland
suburb, is a city funded committee, composed of representatives
of all of the actors in the home delivery system, including real
estate agents, appraisers, mortgage bankers, savings and loan of-
ficers, and commercial bankers, in addition to community resi-
dents and city personnel. This committee monitors lending
practices, develops code enforcement programs, initiates redevel-
148. The questions asked were: "Would you rate your contact with (1, 2, 3), as being a
positive, negative, or neutral experience? Why?" Ad at 5, No. 14d.
149. Members of this organization occupied the lobby area of one fimancial institution
for an afternoon, after the officers of the institution refused their request for a meeting to
discuss lending in their neighborhood. The group brought picnic lunches and transistor
radios into the building. They were orderly but of course little work was accomplished
that afternoon by the employees of the financial institution.
150. The questions asked were:
-Has - had any contact with local, state, or federal public officials or
agencies with respect to redlining issues in the past two years?
-Approximately how many different contacts of this type have you had over this
same two-year period?
-With whom were your (four most recent) contacts?
-Would you rate your contact with (1, 2, 3, 4) as being a positive, negative, or
neutral experience? Why?
Community Interview, supra note 140, at 8-9, Nos. 16-16b, 16d.
151. The question asked was: "Could you please describe your contacts with (1, 2, 3,4),
including your intentions prior to the contact and the results of the contact?" Id at 8, No.
16c.
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opment strategies, and educates the community on how to
purchase a house and how to avoid foreclosure.
Housing organizations have also used their analysis of the dis-
closure statements as an organizing tool in their neighborhoods.
Residents of redlined areas are shown that their savings dollars
are used to further investments in other neighborhoods rather
than in their own. They are encouraged to protest discriminatory
lending practices by depositing their money elsewhere. On occa-
sion, other actions, including picketing, may be taken to attack the
public relations image of a redlining lender. In those instances
where it is possible to point out mortgage investment in the com-
munity, or when negotiations with lenders yield a positive result,
the findings are used to promote confidence in neighborhood
residents. They have also been used to support applications for
community development block grant funds. 152
Some groups feel that several years of disclosure reports will
be necessary to identify lending trends in the community they
serve. In the meantime, they collect and analyze the reports in or-
der to monitor lenders' compliance with the provisions of the
HMDA. Several groups have written letters advising the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board and the Federal Reserve of their find-
ings.
C. Financial Institutions' Use of Disclosure Data
Two-thirds of the responding financial institutions, including
both commercial banks and savings and loan associations, have
analyzed their own disclosure reports.'5 3 Most used the data to
determine their geographic loan distribution patterns. 154 Many
found that loan investment is greatest around the institutions'
branch offices.'5 5 Some institutions found that little money is in-
vested in the inner city;' 56 others found that too much is invested
in "doubtful" areas.157
152. The questions asked were the same as those asked concerning the findings of the
housing organizations after they analyzed the disclosure statements. See notes 143 & 144
.supra.
153. The questions asked were: "Has your institution analyzed the data from its own
disclosure report? What were your findings? Did you use these findings for any specific
purpose?" Financial Interview, supra note 144, at 7, Nos. 36-36b.
154. Seventy percent.
155. Twenty-three percent.
156. Eight percent.
157. Eight percent.
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One-half of the group which analyzed their reports did not in-
tend to use their findings for any specific purpose. Others indi-
cated that the results would be used to increase their knowledge of
where loans are being made, to pick new locations for branches, to
talk to city governments, and to more actively encourage home
loans in areas most in need of them.
Only one financial institution had collected disclosure reports
from other lenders.'58 Another institution disclosed that savings
and loan institutions had met and decided that "it would not be
necessary to exchange reports-that would only waste paper."
Several mentioned, however, that they had seen newspaper analy-
ses of the disclosure data.15
9
D. Newspaper Analyses of Disclosure Data
In January 1977, Thomas S. Andrzejewski authored a 2-day
series of articles in the Plain Dealer analyzing the data obtained
from financial institutions in Cuyahoga County under the
HMDA.' 60 The analysis entailed counting the number of houses"
(with four or less units) within each zip code zone from the 1974
Real Property Inventory. Areas of the county-inner city east,
inner city west, inner ring, middle ring, and outer ring sub-
urbs-were compared by the number of conventional mortgages
per one hundred houses in each zip code zone. Four patterns
emerged from this analysis. First, all white or mainly white sec-
tions of Cuyahoga County received a far greater proportion of
conventional mortgages than did the black sections. Second, the
suburbs averaged twice as many mortgages for every one hundred
houses as the city and more than three times the mortgages
granted on the predominantly black, east side of the city. Third,
with the exception of two inner ring suburbs, lenders were making
few conventional mortgages in integrated suburbs. Finally, there
was little correlation between the percentage of mortgages in
given areas of the city and the percentage of loan offices in those
areas.
158. The questions asked were: "Has your institution obtained the disclosure reports of
any other lenders? Has your institution analyzed the data from that report? What were
your findings? Did you use these findings for any specific purpose?" Financial Interview,
supra note 144, at 7, Nos. 37-37c.
159. See notes 160, 161 infra and accompanying text.
160. Andrzejewski, Morgageville's a Suburb, The Plain Dealer (Cleveland), Jan. 2,
1977, § 2, at 1, col. I.
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Andrzejewski disclaimed any ability to prove or disprove red-
lining or any other kind of mortgage discrimination with the in-
formation provided by the HMDA. His work did, however,
substantiate the primary complaint of housing organizations
throughout the county-that there is less conventional lending in
the older, poorer, or integrated neighborhoods.
Financial institutions were uniformly aware of the Plain
Dealer study, which included summaries of the lending data for
ten commercial banks and thirty-four savings and loan associa-
tions. The lending institutions rebutted the findings of this study
on the same grounds that they dismissed the analyses of the hous-
ing organizations-that "they can only make loans in neighbor-
hoods where there are home sales and where prospective buyers
apply for mortgages."' 16' The newspaper analysis illuminated a
second weakness of the HMDA: thorough analysis requires a
great deal of time, access to skilled personnel, and sophisticated
equipment. The research coordinator of the Plain Dealer's mar-
ket research department began programming the computer and
computerizing the data in October 1976. Three months of work
produced hundreds of pages of computer printouts covering more
than one billion dollars of loans. No housing organization in
Cuyahoga County has resources to conduct a comprehensive
mortgage analysis of this kind.162
E. Use of the Disclosure Data by Individuals
Forty-two per cent of the residents of Cuyahoga County have
heard of the HMDA according to the Cleveland Area Survey,
conducted during the early months of 1977.163 A little less than
two per cent of those polled belong to organizations among whose
goals is the prevention of housing discrimination. 6' Surpris-
161. Id at col. 2.
162. See note 9 supra.
163. The question asked was: "Financial institutions like banks and savings and loans
are now required by law to make available to the public, information about where they
lend money for mortgage and home improvement loans, and how much money they lend.
Are you aware of this law?" Staruch, Sampling and Sample Characteristics-Cleveland
Area Survey: 1976 and 1977 (1977) (unpublished: available at Cleveland Area Survey, De-
partment of Sociology, Case Western Reserve University). The Cleveland Area Survey
was conducted within the three months following the Plain Dealer series on the HMDA.
164. The questions asked were: "Do you know of any groups around where you live
that are organized to prevent discrimination against people who either want to improve
their homes or buy homes around there? What are the names of these groups? Do you
belong to any of these groups?" Id
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ingly, twice this number of people attempted to obtain copies of
the disclosed reports. More than three percent succeeded in doing
so. Of this latter group, twenty-eight percent actually used the
reports in some way, and twenty percent anticipated using them in
the future. 6
5
IV. WHAT MORE SHOULD BE DONE?
A. Recommended Changes in the Home Mortgage Disclosure
Act
Redlining is a problem that causes deterioration of neighbor-
hoods. It may occur because lenders fail to consider the social im-
pact of the large number of discretionary choices made in the
course of business. Because federally regulated financial institu-
tions receive certain benefits from the government, they should be
held accountable for their lending activities when these activities
affect localized areas of the economy, such as housing in urban
neighborhoods.' 66
Congress has begun to deal specifically with redlining and its
concomitant problems. The HMDA was a beginning, designed to
set the background and provide information about the problem.
But, as noted above, its use has been limited.'67 A comparison of
the provisions of the Act with the mechanism of redlining reveals
that the basic difficulty with the Act is that it does not provide
enough information to prove that redlining exists. The Act re-
quires that reporting institutions disclose their lending patterns,
but the disclosure statements fail to reveal the number of appli-
cants who were denied loans. The basic test for redlining must be
a comparison between the number of loans requested and the
number of loans made within each census tract.
The absence of information indicating loan demand is a major
source of criticism by housing organizations in Cuyahoga
County.16 8  Not only did the organizations want the numbers of
165. The questions asked were: "Have you ever tried to get this information? (refers to
questions on awareness of the HMDA). Did you get this information? What have you
done or do you intend to do with this information?" Id
166. See note 102 supra and accompanying text.
167. See notes 140-65 su.pra and accompanying text.
168. When asked an open-ended question of what changes should be made in the
HMDA, 60% of the housing organizations suggested inclusion of loan demand informa-
tion. Community Interview, supra note 140, at 16, No. 38a. When financial institutions
were asked whether information about applications for mortgages should be included in
the Act's reporting requirements, 17% replied affirmatively. Financial Interview, supra
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refusals listed by areas, but they also suggested the need for infor-
mation about the reasons for the refusal and the race and sex of
the applicants. Such information would obviously be helpful in
order to determine whether discrimination is occurring. 16
9
Of course, the process of considering an applicant for a loan is
structured in such a way that an accurate count of applicants may
be difficult to establish. Who is an applicant? The prospective
buyer who is steered away from a particular neighborhood by a
real estate broker who knows or thinks he knows banks will not
lend there? The buyer who has found a home and is screened out
by the loan officer before a formal application form is completed?
The buyer who has paid an application fee but is refused by the
loan officer after a credit check and property appraisal? The
buyer whose application is refused by the loan committee? This
problem is probably not insurmountable, however, in view of sim-
ilar legislation dealing with credit application denials. 170
In order to detect redlining at its earlier stages,171 information
in addition to that pertaining to loan refusals is necessary. The
terms of mortgages granted should be spelled out, including inter-
est rates, discount points and other fees, years until maturity, and
percentage of downpayment required.
According to twenty percent of the housing organizations and
seventeen percent of the financial institutions, the distribution of
deposits of the financial institutions should also be shown by cen-
sus tract. Disclosure of deposits was an original provision of the
bill as introduced in committee,172 but it was subsequently re-
moved before enactment. Opposition to the provision was based
on a fear of credit allocation 173 and on the concern of financial
note 144, at 6, No. 33. Commentators on the Act also suggest the failure to provide loan
demand information is one of its major drawbacks. See, e.g., Renne, Eliminating Redlining
by JudicialAction: Are Erasers Available?, 29 VAND. L. REv. 987, 1004 (1976); Comment,
Red-Lining and the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975: A Decisive Step Toward Private
Urban Redevelopment, 25 EMORY L.J. 667, 697 (1976).
169. Thirty-five percent of the financial institutions agreed with the housing organiza-
tions that the race and sex of the borrower would be an appropriate subject for disclosure
under the HMDA, Financial Interview, supra note 144, at 6, No. 33, but they were not
asked whether that information should be available for loan applicants.
170. See The Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1976). This Act is
designed to ensure extension of credit "to all creditworthy customers" regardless of sex or
marital status, and contains a definition of an "applicant." Id § 1691a.
171. See notes 74-77 supra and accompanying text.
172. See Hearings, supra note 138, at 7.
173. See, e.g., Minority Views on H.R. 10024, The Minority [sic] Disclosure Act of 1975,
H.R. ReP. No. 561, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 32, reprinted in [19751 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
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institutions that the publication of such information might weaken
their competitive position relative to each other. Sucha provision,
would measure the institutions' investment in the areas from
which they derive their investment capital. In addition, disclo-
sure of depository information would provide useful information
for other aspects of regulation such as charter renewal or applica-
tions for branching.'74
The difficulty of obtaining and using the information reported
by the HMDA limited the usefulness of the disclosure information
to housing organizations in particular. Centralized collection and
analysis of the data would be a reasonable method of making the
information more accessible and usable. Centralization is not re-
quired by the Act or its regulations. In fact, the Federal Reserve
Board has discounted recommendations for centralized data col-
lection and analysis as contrary to the intent of the Act.17 5 The
Board reasoned that Congress had intended to avoid additional
bureaucratic involvement by making the information directly
available to private groups or individuals, so that the private bod-
ies could take direct action. The Board failed to consider the rela-
tive ease with which statements could be compiled and analyzed,
and the results disseminated by one agency among groups or indi-
viduals for free or at cost. In comparison, the present system in
which an institution's disclosure statements are available only at
the main office and one branch office of each institution causes
individuals and groups to spend an inordinate amount of time du-
plicating each others' efforts to collect disclosure statements from
all institutions in an area. Moreover, since the disclosure state-
ments received are generally computer printouts, the information
NEWS 2326, 2327; Wisniewski, Mortgage Redlining (Disinvestment): The Parameters of Fed-
eral, State, and Municial Regulation, 54 1. OF URa. L. 367, 378 (1977).
174. The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-128, tit. VIII, 91 Stat.
1147 (to be codified in 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2905) was enacted in October 1977 to "require
each appropriate Federal financial supervisory agency to use its authority when examining
financial institutions, to encourage such institutions to help meet the credit needs of the
local communities in which they are chartered consistent with the safe and sound operation
of such institutions." Id § 2901(b). Depository information would be helpful in defining
the community to which the institutions must be responsive.
175. Speaking on behalf of the Federal Reserve System, Theodore Allison stated: "The
compilation of the information at the Federal level would not be in the spirit of the act
because the Congress determined that local studies and solutions are the appropriate mech-
anism for dealing with local problems of disinvestment." Letter from Theodore E. Al-
lison, Secretary, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System, Washington, D.C., to David
L. Hoehnen, Associate Director, Commission on Catholic Community Action, Cleveland,
Ohio (Apr. 29, 1977).
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is relatively difficult to decipher. Even when the information is
comprehensible, the simple arithmetic comparisons needed for
analysis are time consuming without access to computer time.
When the time necessary to collect the statements is combined
with the time required to do a simple comparative analysis be-
tween institutions, and this is multiplied by each individual or
group who is interested in using the information, the costs in time
alone make access to the information extremely expensive.
76
This does not even take into account the copying expenses that the
institutions can pass on to those who use the disclosure state-
ments.1 77  It is apparent that tremendous disincentives are inher-
ent in the Act and its regulations. These disincentives conflict
with the express purpose of the Act and should be eliminated by
centralizing collection and basic analysis within each area, and by
making reports available to the public upon request.
Another weakness of the HMDA is that only depository insti-
tutions are required to report their lending activities. 17  These in-
stitutions conduct a large part of the residential mortgage lending
in the country;17 9 nevertheless, mortgage companies are unregu-
lated by either the state or federal government and provide mort-
gages for many of the FHA insured home purchases. In fact,
many of the accusations regarding abuse of the FHA program and
other kinds of speculation are leveled at mortgage companies. As
conventional lending becomes less available in an area, mortgage
bankers become a more attractive source of funds when homes are
bought and sold. 8 The HMDA should be amended to require
any commercial lenders of residential mortgages to report.18'
176. An additional time cost in the present study was incurred when a savings and loan
company made "the materials available for copying," 12 C.F.R. § 203.5(c) (1977), by al-
lowing anyone who wanted the information reported to copy it by hand. All other institu-
tions made copies available.
177. The total amount paid to the 38 financial institutions surveyed for their disclosure
reports was $53.38. The cost per page ranged from zero to $1.67. A copy of the disclosure
statement of the institution referred to in note 176 supra was obtained from other sources.
178. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801, 2802(2), 2803 (1976).
179. See notes 26-29 supra and accompanying text.
180. See note 26 supra and accompanying text. Thus, the ratio between lending by
mortgage companies and lending by conventional lenders is an excellent indicator of red-
lining.
181. Twenty percent of the housing organizations suggested, in open-ended answers to
a question requesting recommended changes in the Act, that mortgage companies be in-
cluded in the Act's reporting requirements. Community Interview, supra note 140, at 16,
No. 33. Forty-eight percent of the financial institutions responded positively to the ques-
tion whether mortgage bankers should be included. Financial Interview, supra note 144,
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Despite the limitations of the HMDA, all the housing organi-,
zations andl slightly more than one-half the financial institutions
were opposed to permitting it to expire as it is scheduled to do in
December 1979.82 All but two of the housing organizations indi-
cated that it should be reenacted but with substantial changes.
On the other hand, a quarter of the financial institutions suggested
that it be reenacted as is, while another quarter suggested reenact-
ment with substantial changes. The consensus of opinion is that
the HMDA provides benefits which outweigh the costs of disclo-
sure.
B. Towards Preventing Redlining and Its Effects
No one can argue that the HMDA is sufficient to eliminate the
problems surrounding redlining. Housing organizations and fi-
nancial institutions suggested numerous approaches to end redlin-
ing which are also discussed in the literature. The proposals seek
either to return conventional financing to areas which have lost
(or are losing) it or to alleviate the effects of loss of conventional
financing. Combinations of these programs may temporarily alle-
viate the problem, and over the long run they may improve the
investment environment sufficiently to bring back conventional fi-
nancing. The programs generally focus on incentives or regula-
tions to initiate reinvestment, or on the development of alternative
financing by private organizations and public officials.
Broad agreement exists among the financial institutions and
housing organizations surveyed that community groups play a vi-
tal role in encouraging reinvestment. When asked what is neces-
sary to encourage investment, one-quarter of the financial
institutions specifically suggested that neighborhood groups must
provide the impetus to upgrade the quality of city neighbor-
at 6, No. 38a. They generally indicated that if depository institutions must report, so
should nondepository mortgage companies.
182. 12 U.S.C. § 2809 (1976). The question asked of housing organizations and of
financial institutions was: "Do you think that the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975
should a) be allowed to expire; b) be reenacted as is; or c) be substantially changed?"
Community Interview, supra note 140, at 15, No. 38; Financial Interview, supra note 144,
at 5, No. 29.
Housing organizations which wanted substantial changes were asked: "What should
these changes be?" Community Interview, supra note 140, at 16, No. 38a. The changes
suggested, in addition to those discussed in the text, were that a 2- or 3-year retroactivity of
the disclosure requirement be implemented, that the data be more specific and standard-
ized, and that financial institutions be required to divulge their full investment portfolios.
The financial institutions were then asked their reactions to the housing organizations' rec-
ommendations.
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hoods-by encouraging home improvements, building commu-
nity pride, and negotiating with lenders.' 83 Two institutions
suggested an educational campaign to inform the public regarding
the availability and processes of obtaining mortgages and the ne-
cessity for proper upkeep of the mortgaged premises. Presumably
such an educational program could also be handled by commu-
nity housing organizations, preferably in cooperation with city of-
ficials and financial institutions.
Housing organizations surveyed in this study also felt they had
an important role to play in combating redlining by keeping the
problem in the public eye.' 84  They suggested putting pressure on
financial institutions and on government to deal with the
problems by "greenlining" "'-petitioning for city services, ac-
cumulating information on practices in the community, and com-
municating directly and through the media with financial
institutions and governmental officials.
Government-at local, state, and national levels-is seen as an
indispensable party in eliminating redlining. Control of financial
institutions can be made more specific and enforced more vigor-
ously through legislation, regulation, and governmental scru-
tiny.'86 Reorganizing or revamping federal governmental
183. The question asked was: "Assuming that one of the purposes of the HMDA is to
encourage reinvestment in residential areas where loans have not been readily available,
what suggestions would you have to accomplish that purpose?" Financial Interview, supra
note 144, at 9, No. 45. Cooperative reinvestment programs were suggested by 14% of the
financial institutions.
184. For a description of their activities, see notes 9 & 39 supra and accompanying text.
185. "Greenlining" is considered an antidote to redlining. Depositors withdraw their
deposits from institutions that redline their community and redeposit their money in more
responsive institutions.
186. Anti-redlining regulations by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board will provide
much of this necessary governmental supervision. 43 Fed. Reg. 22,332 (1978) (to be codi-
fied as an amendment to 12 C.F.R. §§ 528, 531.8).
The regulations prohibit home loan denials, refusals to accept loan applications,
or loan offers on less favorable terms because of the age of a dwelling or the
neighborhood where it is located; they require written, nondiscriminatory under-
writing standards and periodic review of advertising and marketing practices to
assure that services of the lender are available to all segments of the community it
serves; and the regulations prohibit discrimination in home lending on the basis
of the applicant's marital status, age, receipt of income from public assistance
programs, or good faith exercise of rights under various consumer protection acts.
Speech by Donna Shalala, Assistant Secretary for Policy Development and Research, U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development, at Housing and Community Develop-
ment Conference, Case Western Reserve University School of Law (Mar. 4, 1978). See also
the recommendations in Earthman, Residential Mortgage Lending- Charting a Course
Through the Regulatory Maze, 29 VAND. L. REV. 957 (1976), and Wisniewski, supra note
173.
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programs such as FHA insurance8 7 and the secondary mortgage
market18 can enhance their constructive effect on neighborhoods.
Local governments can improve essential services 89 and enforce
housing codes.190
Additional cooperation between government, financial institu-
tions, and neighborhoods may enhance the chances for neighbor-
hood revitalization. Affirmative investment programs, such as
Neighborhood Housing Services,19' which require financial and
governmental support in specific targeted neighborhoods, have
been somewhat effective in slowing or reversing deterioration.
Governmental requirements that financial institutions establish
assigned-risk pools may provide mortgages to individuals for
whom they would otherwise be unavailable. 9 2
Financial institutions remain the primary perpetrators of red-
lining. They must be encouraged or compelled to accept respon-
sibility for the consequences of their lending choices. The
latitude in their financial decisionmaking would permit them to
avert discrimination and its effects. The HMDA can be useful in
encouraging the accountability of financial institutions. The
HMDA provides information that enables lenders to appreciate
the cumulative effect of their individual decisions. The Act also
provides information to private citizens, their organizations, and
thei'.r representatives in government, making it possible for them to
note lending patterns and confront financial institutions with their
role in neighborhood change.
The HMDA is far from being a panacea. But it may crack the
wall of "business necessity" which has shielded financial institu-
tions from public accountability. And in so doing, it will perhaps
187. See Note, Attacking the Urban Redlining Problem, 56 B.U. L. Rnv. 989, 1014-16
(1976).
188. See Earthman, supra note 186.
189. This suggestion was mentioned by 14% of the financial institutions in response to
the question quoted at note 183 supra.
190. This suggestion was mentioned by 17% of the financial institutions in response to
the question quoted at note 183 supra.
191. For a description of Neighborhood Housing Services, see Duncan, Hood, & Neet,
Redlining Practices, Racial Resegregation, and Urban Decay" Neighborhood Housing Serv-
ices as a Viable Alternative, 7 URB. LAW. 510 (1975).
192. This suggestion was mentioned by 17% of the financial institutions. See also rec-
ommendations in Note, supra note 155, at 1016-18, on assigned-risk insurance pools.
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begin the downfall of a destructive discriminatory structure and
create in its place a cooperative financial structure.
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